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INTEREST OR PRINCIPLES?: THE LEGAL CHALLENGE
TO IOLTA IN WASHINGTON STATE
Jay Carlson
Abstract: Interest on Lawyer Trust Accounts (IOLTA) programs exist in all fifty states
and raise significant funding for legal services for the poor. A recent series of federal court
lawsuits seeks to eliminate IOLTA programs on the grounds that they violate the Fifth and
First Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. Washington Legal Foundation v. Legal
Foundation of Washington, currently on appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit,
is one such lawsuit challenging Washington State's IOLTA program. In Phillips v.
Washington Legal Foundation, a similar case from Texas, the U.S. Supreme Court recently
ruled that funds raised through IOLTA represent "property" for the purposes of Fifth
Amendment takings analysis. The Phillips ruling gives new momentum to the ongoing
constitutional challenges to IOLTA. This Comment examines Legal Foundation of
Washington in light of the Supreme Court's holding in Phillips and argues that the
constitutional challenge to Washington's IOLTA program is without merit and should be
rejected by the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
It is a basic tenet of our constitutional system that all citizens are
entitled to "the equal protection of the laws."' Yet in America today,
eighty percent of the legal needs of low-income people are unmet.'
IOLTA programs seek to address this disturbing situation.
IOLTA stands for Interest on Lawyer Trust Accounts and is a
mechanism by which states fund legal aid programs for the poor. IOLTA
programs are the second largest source of funding for indigent legal
services, providing basic civil legal assistance for an estimated 1,700,000
people each year IOLTA plays an indispensable role in the legal
services system, helping to protect basic civil rights for the poor in
America.
A recent series of federal court lawsuits has challenged IOLTA
programs, claiming that IOLTA violates both the Fifth and the First
Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. These suits, which seek to
eliminate IOLTA programs, have been brought by a conservative legal
activist organization from Washington, D.C., the Washington Legal
Foundation. In Phillips v. Washington Legal Foundation,4  the
1. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
2. See David Barringer, Downs izedJustice, A.B.A. J., July 1996, at 60, 62.
3. See W. Frank Newton & James W. Paulsen, Constitutional Challenges to IOLTA Revisited, 101
Dick. L. Rev. 549, 550 (1997).
4. 524 U.S. 156 (1998).
1119
Washington Law Review
Washington Legal Foundation sued the IOLTA program in Texas.' That
suit resulted in a key ruling from the U.S. Supreme Court, holding that
the funds raised through IOLTA represented "property" for the purposes
of Fifth Amendment takings analysis.' In Washington Legal Foundation
v. Legal Foundation of Washington,' the Washington Legal Foundation
has also sued the IOLTA program in Washington State, and the case is
currently on appeal in the Ninth Circuit
This Comment analyzes Legal Foundation of Washington in the
context of prior legal challenges to IOLTA and examines particularly the
U.S. Supreme Court decision in Phillips. Part I discusses the importance
of IOLTA programs and their history across the nation and in
Washington State. Part II establishes the legal context for the recent
IOLTA lawsuits, and Part III discusses the previous legal challenges to
IOLTA. Part IV analyzes Legal Foundation of Washington and
concludes that Washington's IOLTA program does not violate Fifth or
First Amendment protections.
I. THE IMPORTANCE AND HISTORY OF IOLTA
A. The Importance of IOL TA
IOLTA works by requiring attorneys to pool small or short-term client
deposits into special IOLTA bank accounts. The interest earned on these
accounts is then used to fund legal services programs. By pooling these
small and otherwise unproductive deposits, IOLTA generates
approximately $100 million dollars per year nationally.9 The money is
used to provide legal assistance for battered women, migrant farm
workers, and immigrants seeking political asylum, among others."0
Because of the reduction in funding of legal aid from other sources,
5. See id. at 156.
6. See id. at 172.
7. No. C-97-0146C (W.D. Wash. Jan. 30, 1998). The Washington Legal Foundation is a
Washington, D.C., legal activist organization that is suing IOLTA programs across the country. The
Legal Foundation of Washington is the agency in Washington State that distributes IOLTA funds.
8. See id. (order granting defendants' motion for summary judgment).
9. See Brent Salmons, IOLTAs: Good Work or Good Riddance?, 11 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 259, 259
(1998).
10. For an example of the types of programs funded by IOLTA, see Legal Found. of Wash.,
Welcome to the Legal Foundation of Washington's Grants Section (visited Sept. 20, 1999)
<http://www.legalfoundation.org/grants.htm>.
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IOLTA has grown in importance as a source of financial support for
these services."
Unlike IOLTA funds, other sources of legal-aid funding suffer from
onerous restrictions. 2 The federal government distributes approximately
$300 million per year to legal aid programs through the Legal Services
Corporation (LSC). 3 However, the federal government limits how LSC
funds are spent, preventing programs from serving migrant farm
workers, Native American groups, residents of juvenile and adult
correctional facilities, and other groups. 4 The LSC also restricts the
kinds of advocacy that programs can provide, prohibiting, among other
things, class action suits and welfare reform challenges. 5 Because
IOLTA funds are not as limited, they fill important gaps left by the
federal restrictions.
Even with IOLTA, the total of federal and state funds currently spent
on legal services is woefully inadequate to meet the legal needs of
disadvantaged people in America. 6 At current funding levels, eighty
percent of the legal needs of low-income people go unmet. 7 The
potential end of IOLTA programs looms as a disaster for the legal rights
of the poor in America.
B. IOLTA's History
In effect, IOLTA converts funds that were formerly provided to banks
as unearned windfall profits to beneficial social use. IOLTA exists as an
outgrowth of federal banking law. Before IOLTA, attorneys often held
small sums of client money, or larger sums for short periods of time, in
pooled trust accounts. 8 Ethical rules required lawyers to maintain client
11. See Salmons, supra note 9, at 264.
12. See Access to Justice Bd., Washington State Bar Ass'n, Plan for the Delivery of Civil Legal
Services to Low-Income People in Washington State 2 (rev. ed. Nov. 1995) [hereinafter Plan for
Civil Legal Services].
13. See James C. Moore, Congress Right to OK $300 Million for Legal Services, Times Union
(Albany), Nov. 9, 1998, at Al0.
14. See Plan for Civil Legal Services, supra note 12, at 3.
15. See id.
16. See Barringer, supra note 2, at 62.
17. See id.
18. See Salmons, supra note 9, at 260; see also Washington Legal Found. v. Massachusetts Bar
Found., 993 F.2d 962, 968 (Ist Cir. 1993).
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funds so that the money was immediately available for withdrawal.' 9
However, federal banking regulations did not allow checking accounts to
earn interest, and this restriction prevented these pooled accounts from
earning interest.2" Banks that held these funds could invest and earn
interest on them.2 Therefore, before IOLTA, these pooled client
accounts "amounted to interest-free loans to banks."22
In 1980, changes in federal banking law created negotiable order of
withdrawal (NOW) accounts, or interest-bearing checking accounts.23 It
became possible to pool small or short-term client deposits into checking
accounts and theoretically earn interest for the individual depositors.24
However, banks had to "sub-account" such pooled accounts to track each
depositor's interest.' Consequently, the costs of setting up and
administering such accounts exceeded the interest that individual
depositors earned.26 Also, ethical rules prohibited attorneys from
charging fees for administering pooled NOW accounts, and
administration time was nonbillable.27 As a result, attorneys did not use
NOW accounts to earn interest for client depositors.2
Because nonprofit organizations and public entities may use NOW
accounts,2 9 IOLTA programs create eligible nonprofit organizations and
make them the sole recipients of the interest produced by the pooled trust
funds.30 By designating all of the interest to one recipient, sub-accounting
costs are avoided and the interest earned exceeds the costs of
administering the account.3' IOLTA programs allow these monies, which
cannot earn net interest for the individual depositors, to earn net interest
for a nonprofit foundation. The nonprofit foundation then distributes
these funds to legal services programs.
19. See Cone v. State Bar, 819 F.2d 1002, 1005 (1 1th Cir. 1987).
20. See Massachusetts Bar Found., 993 F.2d at 968.
21. See Cone, 819 F.2d at 1005.
22. Salmons, supra note 9, at 261.
23. See Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-
221, § 303, 94 Stat. 132, 146 (1980) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1832 (1994)).
24. See Salmons, supra note 9, at 261.
25. See Cone, 819 F.2d at 1006.
26. See id.
27. See Salmons, supra note 9, at 260-61.
28. See id. at 261.
29. See 12 U.S.C. § 1832(a)(2) (1994) (discussing depositors eligible to use NOW accounts).
30. See Cone, 819 F.2d at 1006.
31. See id.
1122
Vol. 74:1119, 1999
Washington State IOLTA Program
Florida instituted the first American IOLTA program in 19812 Since
then, all fifty states have authorized IOLTA programs either through
court rule or by statute.3 Although Florida originally enacted a voluntary
program, IOLTA programs are now mandatory in twenty-seven states. 4
IOLTA rules require all attorneys who receive client funds to
determine whether the funds are IOLTA eligible. 5 Only funds that are
nominal, or are to be held for a short period of time, are pooled into
IOLTA accounts. 6 If a client deposit is large enough or will be held long
enough to earn net interest for the client, it does not qualify for IOLTA.3 7
C. IOLTA 's Development in Washington State
In 1984, the Supreme Court of Washington created Washington's
IOLTA program. The state legislature has delegated authority to the
state supreme court to regulate the activities of the legal profession
through control over the Rules of Professional Conduct (RPC) 9
Pursuant to this authority, the court created IOLTA by approving RPC
1.14, which requires lawyers in Washington to use IOLTA accounts for
client deposits when appropriate.4 When a lawyer receives client funds
incident to a legal transaction, he or she must determine if the "funds
[could] be invested.., to provide a positive net return to the client. ' 41 If
32. See Katherine Elrich, Equal Justice Under the Law (If You Can Afford It): Fifih Circuit
Threatens Texas'OLTA Progrdm, 28 Tex. Tech L. Rev. 887, 894 (1997).
33. See Gill Deford et al., The Supreme Court's 1997-1998 Term: The Texas Interest on Lawyers
Trust Account Case and Others Affecting Access to Justice, Clearinghouse Rev., Nov.-Dec. 1988, at
287,288 n.4.
34. See Salmons, supra note 9, at 263.
35. See, e.g., Wash. Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.14(c)(3) (1999).
36. See Elrich, supra note 32, at 893.
37. See Wash. Rules ofProfessional Conduct Rule 1.14(c)(3).
38. See Wash. Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.14 (1999). The provision that created
IOLTA in Washington, RPC 1.14, was proposed by the Washington State Bar Association in 1981
and approved by the state supreme court in 1984. See Supreme Court of Washington, IOLTA
Adoption Order, 1101-15 (June 19, 1984) [hereinafter IOLTA Adoption Order].
39. See Wash. Rev. Code § 2.48.060 (1998); see also Wash. General Rule 9 (original rule
effective Mar. 19, 1982, amendment effective Sept. 1, 1984). The Washington State Bar Association
must first propose such rules. See Wash. General Rule 9 (outlining rule-making procedure for
Supreme Court of Washington).
40. See Wash. Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.14(a).
41. Wash. Rules of Professional Conduct 1.14(c)(3). Three factors are considered: the amount of
interest the funds would generate, the costs of administering the account (including the costs of the
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the client cannot earn a positive net return, the funds are deposited in an
IOLTA account, and the interest is paid to the Legal Foundation of
Washington (the Foundation).42 The Foundation disburses these funds to
legal services programs throughout Washington.
1. The Limited Practice Officer Program and JOLTA
In 1995, Washington State's IOLTA regime broadened to include
Limited Practice Officers (LPOs). Since 1983, Washington State has
authorized nonlawyers, as LPOs, to "select, prepare and complete legal
documents incident to the closing of real estate and personal property
transactions., 43  LPOs may provide these legal services to title
companies, banks, mortgage companies, and lawyers." Use of LPOs
reduces transaction costs because an attorney is not required to complete
routine legal documents.
The rule authorizing LPOs to perform certain legal services did not
require them to participate in IOLTA.45 Although the rule-making
processes that created LPOs and IOLTA proceeded in tandem, the
drafters of the LPO provisions overlooked the potential to include LPO
transactions within IOLTA.4 In 1995, after much debate, the Supreme
Court of Washington resolved this issue by modifying Admission to
Practice Rule (APR) 12(h) and adopting APR 12.1, which established
that title and escrow transactions facilitated by LPOs are covered by
IOLTA rules.47 This addition significantly boosted overall IOLTA
funding.4
8
lawyer's services), and the capability of the financial institution to calculate and pay interest to
individual depositors. See Wash. Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.14(c)(3)(i)-(iii).
42. See Wash. Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.14(c)(1).
43. Wash. Admission to Practice Rule 12 (1999). The Admission to Practice Rules are subject to
approval and modification by the Supreme Court of Washington on recommendation from the
Washington State Bar Association. See Wash. General Rule 9. LPOs are licensed by the Limited
Practice Board. See Wash. Admission to Practice Rule 12(b).
44. See Wash. Admission to Practice Rule 12(d).
45. See Board of Governors, Washington State Bar Ass'n, GR 9 Cover Sheet: Proposal to Create
New Admission to Practice Rules 12(h) and 12.1, at 2 (1994).
46. See id.
47. See Wash. Admission to Practice Rule 12(h) (original rule effective Jan. 21, 1983; amendment
effective Oct. 28, 1983; Sept. 13, 1985; Dec. 9, 1995); Admission to Practice Rule 12.1 (effective
Dec. 9, 1995).
48. See Legal Found. of Wash., supra note 10 (providing year-by-year description of IOLTA
proceeds received by Foundation).
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2. The Legal Foundation of Washington
The Legal Foundation of Washington is the granting agency that
distributes IOLTA money to civil legal services programs throughout
Washington.49 The Foundation currently funds thirty-six legal services
programs."0 In 1998, it distributed $6,149,773.1 Columbia Legal
Services received $4,200,000, funding eight offices throughout
Washington. 2 Other programs receiving IOLTA funds included pro bono
attorney systems in twenty-three Washington counties and several
specialty legal services providers. 3 These programs aid migrant farm-
workers, immigrant refugees, unemployed workers, battered women, and
other disadvantaged groups.' The Foundation is also an integral member
of the Washington State Access to Justice Network, which is a public-
private partnership that seeks to coordinate efficiently civil legal services
for low-income residents of Washington.55
3. Legal Questions Posed by the Adoption ofIOLTA in Washington
Despite the significant benefits provided by IOLTA, there have
always been pockets of opposition in the legal community. After the
Washington State Bar Association proposed IOLTA in Washington, the
Supreme Court of Washington received objections to the program during
the rule making comment period.56 These objections foreshadowed later
legal challenges to IOLTA.
Some attorneys in Washington argued to the court that the IOLTA
program constituted an unconstitutional taking of private property. 7
They argued that the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Webb's Fabulous
Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith 8 stood for the "broad general proposition
49. See Wash. Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.14 (1999).
50. See Legal Found. of Wash., supra note 10.
51. See id.
52. See id
53. See id.
54. See id.
55. See Legal Found. of Wash., Home Page (visited Sept. 20,1999) <http://www.legalfoundation.org>.
56. See IOLTA Adoption Order, supra note 38, at 1101 (The court received 531 public
comments, 424 of which (80 percent) supported the proposed IOLTA program."). Any proposed
change to the rules governing the legal profession must be published for comment before it is
adopted. See Wash. General Rule 9(f) (1999).
57. See IOLTA Adoption Order, supra note 38, at 1104-09.
58. 449 U.S. 155 (1980).
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that interest is property."59 In Webb's, originally a Florida case, a
corporate plaintiff filed an interpleader action to enforce a contract to
purchase Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies for $1,812,145.77.0 In
accordance with the rules of interpleader, the plaintiff deposited the
disputed amount with the court clerk.6' The court clerk collected a
percentage fee for services rendered on the fund,62 and Florida law also
allowed the court to keep all of the interest earned on the deposit, which
amounted to over $100,000.63 Webb's sued to recover this amount from
the clerk and claimed that confiscation of the interest proceeds was an
unconstitutional taking.' On appeal, the U.S. Supreme Court agreed with
the plaintiffs in a narrowly tailored holding:
We hold that under the narrow circumstances of this case-where
there is a separate and distinct state statute authorizing a clerk's fee
"for services rendered" based upon the amount of principal
deposited[,] ... the interest earned on the interpleader fund while it
was in the registry of the court was a taking violative of the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments. 65
In 1984, the Supreme Court of Washington, in its IOLTA Adoption
Order, distinguished Webb's and rejected the claim that IOLTA
represented an unconstitutional taking of the private property of deposit
owners.' The court clarified that the only funds eligible under
Washington's IOLTA program are funds that could not under any
circumstances produce net interest payments for the client.67 Given this
distinction, the court concluded that Webb's was inapposite.68 While
Webb 's involved two separate and large levies against a private fund,6 9
IOLTA involves "small amounts of interest on nominal and short-term
trust deposits." '7 A deposit of the size present in Webb 's would not be
59. IOLTA Adoption Order, supra note 38, at 1107.
60. See Webb's, 449 U.S. at 156.
61. See id. at 157.
62. See id.
63. Seeid. at 156 n.1.
64. See id. at 158.
65. Id at 164-65.
66. See IOLTA Adoption Order, supra note 38, at 1109.
67. See id. at 1101.
68. See d at 1107.
69. See id.
70. Id.
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eligible under the Washington IOLTA rule.7 The Supreme Court of
Washington concluded that the "interest on short-term or nominal client
trust funds of the type that must be invested for the benefit of the
Foundation... does not constitute 'property' as defined by the United
States or Washington Constitutions."72 Accordingly, the court adopted
the rule creating Washington's IOLTA program.73
II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT OF IOLTA: FIFTH AND
FIRST AMENDMENT CONSIDERATIONS
The constitutional implications of IOLTA programs have led to
challenges to IOLTA in both state and federal courts. In Legal
Foundation of Washington, the plaintiffs claim that IOLTA violates both
the Fifth Amendment's takings clause and the First Amendment's
freedom-of-association clause.74 A violation of the Fifth Amendment's
takings clause occurs when the government takes private property
without just compensation.' A violation of the First Amendment's
freedom-of-association clause occurs when an organization compels its
members to financially support political activities that are unrelated to
the goals of the organization.76
A. The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment Prohibits Government
from Taking Private Property Without Just Compensation
The takings clause of the Fifth Amendment states: "No person shall
be ... deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law;
nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation."" It applies to the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment.7" While courts have struggled to establish a consistent
interpretation of the takings clause, general principles have emerged.
71. See Wash. Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.14(c)(3)(i)-(iii) (1999).
72. IOLTA Adoption Order, supra note 38, at 1109.
73. See id. at 1115.
74. See Complaint for Injunctive Relief, Washington Legal Found. v. Legal Found. of Wash., No.
C-97-0146C (W.D. Wash. filed Jan. 27, 1997).
75. See U.S. Const. amend. V.
76. See, e.g., Keller v. State Bar, 496 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1990); Chicago Teachers Union Local No. 1
v. Hudson, 475 U.S. 292,301-02 (1986).
77. U.S. Const. amend. V.
78. See, e.g., Chicago, B & Q Ry. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226,239 (1897).
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To prove an unconstitutional taking, claimants must first establish that
a cognizable property right exists in the thing that they claim was taken.79
Property rights are not defined by the U.S. Constitution but rather are
created and defined by independent sources such as state law." A takings
claimant must identify credible sources, such as positive rules of
substantive law, to validate the existence of a property interest." A
"unilateral expectation or an abstract need" does not constitute
property.82
Takings jurisprudence provides no set formula for determining if a
taking has occurred. Courts engage in this inquiry in light of the Fifth
Amendment's purpose, which is to establish a just and fair distribution of
the social burdens that government action creates.' Takings analysis is
essentially an "ad hoc, factual" inquiry.8
The U.S. Supreme Court has identified two general categories of
takings: per se takings and regulatory takings.86 Government action that
deprives property owners of all productive use of property or physically
invades property boundaries is often interpreted as a per se or categorical
taking. 7 However, courts are often reluctant to apply per se takings
analysis to the appropriation of money, because unlike real property,
money is "fungible."88 If government regulation is not considered a per
se taking, courts must still consider whether a regulatory taking has
occurred by evaluating three general factors: (1) the severity of the
economic impact on the takings claimant; (2) the extent to which the
79. See, e.g., Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124-25 (1978).
80. See, e.g., Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972).
81. See, e.g., Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593, 601-02 (1972).
82. Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 161 (1980).
83. See Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124.
84. See, e.g., Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40,49 (1960).
85. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124.
86. See, e.g., Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124 (regulatory taking); Hudson Water Co. v. McCarter,
209 U.S. 349,355 (1908) (categorical taking).
87. See, e.g., Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 426-27 (1982)
(holding that law requiring landlords to allow placement of cable television appliances in apartment
buildings constituted per se taking); Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980) (holding
that regulation destroying all beneficial use of land is categorical taking); Hudson Water Co., 209
U.S. at 355 (stating that if height restrictions render property totally useless, "the rights of property
prevail over the other public interest").
88. See, e.g., United States v. Sperry Corp., 493 U.S. 52, 62 (1989); Branch v. United States, 69
F.3d 1571, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1995); Nixon v. United States, 978 F.2d 1269, 1284-85 (D.C. Cir. 1992);
Commercial Builders v. City of Sacramento, 941 F.2d 872, 875 (9th Cir. 1991).
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regulation interferes with investment-backed expectations; and (3) the
character and benefits of the government regulation. 9 Under this
analysis, if a regulation hs a small economic impact but a large public
benefit, the court is not likely to find a taking.' °
B. The First Amendment Prohibits Compelled Financial Support for
Political and Ideological Activities
An organization may violate the First Amendment right not to
associate when it compels its members to provide financial support for
political activities that are unrelated to the goals of that organization.9
The First Amendment protects the right to speak and associate freely92
and also protects the right not to speak or associate.93 Accordingly, the
U.S. Supreme Court has ruled that organizations that engage in
expressive activities are limited in their ability to force members to
support those activities financially.94
The U.S. Supreme Court has examined this issue in cases involving
labor unions and state bar associations.9" For example, compulsory union
dues that are imposed as a condition of employment cannot be used for
unrelated political activities without the consent of the dues-paying
member.96 Similarly, in Keller v. State Bar,97 the Court established that
compulsory bar association dues could be spent to regulate the legal
profession and improve the administration of justice,98 but could not be
89. See Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124.
90. See, e.g., Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922) ("Government could hardly
go on if to some extent values incident to property could not be diminished without paying for every
such change in the general law.").
91. See, e.g., Keller v. State Bar, 496 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1990); Chicago Teachers Union Local No. I
v. Hudson, 475 U.S. 292,301-02 (1986).
92. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people
peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances." U.S. Const.
amend. I.
93. See, e.g., Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977) ("The right to speak and the right to
refrain from speaking are complementary components of the broader concept of 'individual freedom
of mind."') (quoting West Virginia Bd. ofEduc. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943)).
94. See, e.g., Keller, 496 U.S. at 15-16; Chicago Teachers Union, 475 U.S. at 301-02; Abood v.
Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209,212 (1977).
95. See, e.g., Keller, 496 U.S. 1; Chicago Teachers Union, 475 U.S. 292.
96. See Abood, 431 U.S. at 235-3 6.
97. 496 U.S. 1 (1990).
98. See id. at 13-14.
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spent for overtly political purposes such as advancing voter initiatives.99
However, such activities will not usually run afoul of the First
Amendment when they are related to the legitimate goals of the
organization in question."°r
The First Amendment prohibition may not apply to cases where there
is no mandatory and substantial relationship beyond a financial
contribution. In that circumstance, the objecting party would not
personally be linked to the ideological activities of the organization."0'
The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit has held in an IOLTA context
that to violate the First Amendment, a compelled relationship must go
beyond financial support. 2 In the U.S. Supreme Court cases discussed
above, the compelled financial support takes place in a broader context
of compelled membership or association. In the bar dues case, all
practicing lawyers are required to maintain membership in the
association."13 In the labor union cases, all union contributors are covered
by the collective bargaining agreements." Without this substantial
forced relationship, the constitutional concerns over forced association
are significantly reduced.0 5
Under the government speech doctrine, government agencies do not
suffer the same First Amendment limitations on raising and spending
funds when they engage in government activities, even if those activities
have an ideological component.'0 6 Because government agencies must
make important public policy decisions, they must be free to compel
financial support from citizens and spend such funds freely, even on
99. See id. at 16.
100. See, e.g., Keller, 496 U.S. at 15-16 (indicating that only activities of "political or ideological
coloration which are not reasonably related to the advancement of [the] goals [of an organization]"
implicate First Amendment).
101. See Washington Legal Found. v. Massachusetts Bar Found., 993 F.2d 962, 979 (1st Cir.
1993).
102. See Massachusetts Bar Found., 993 F.2d at 979; see also PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v.
Robbins, 447 U.S. 74, 87-88 (1980).
103. See Keller, 496 U.S. at 16.
104. See Chicago Teachers Union Local No. 1 v. Hudson, 475 U.S. 292, 294 (1986); Abood v.
Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 212 (1977).
105. See Massachusetts Bar Found., 993 F.2d at 979.
106. See Keller, 496 U.S. at 12-13 ("If every citizen were to have a right to insist that no one paid
by public funds express a view with which he disagreed, debate over issues of great concern to the
public would be limited to those in the private sector, and the process of government as we know it
radically transformed."); see also United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 260 (1982).
1130
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controversial projects. °7 This power is essential to the operations of
government.
Lastly, a state is permitted to encroach upon First Amendment rights
when the encroachment is narrowly construed to serve a compelling state
interest.' When a burden on a First Amendment right is closely related
to a legitimate state interest and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest,
some burden is permissible."° Courts evaluate such state action under a
strict scrutiny standard."0
III. HISTORY OF LEGAL CHALLENGES TO IOLTA
Since their inception, IOLTA programs have been challenged on
constitutional grounds in both- state and federal courts. Until recently,
court decisions had been universally favorable to IOLTA, holding that
IOLTA proceeds did not constitute property for the purposes of the Fifth
Amendment. However, in the 1998 case Phillips v. Washington Legal
Foundation, the U.S. Supreme Court held that IOLTA proceeds did
constitute private property within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment
Although the Court did not rule on whether Texas' IOLTA program
effected an unconstitutional taking, the Phillips decision significantly
altered IOLTA case law. The challenge to Washington State's IOLTA
program will be decided within the new legal context created by Phillips.
A. Early Court Challenges Uphold the Constitutionality oflOLTA
In Carroll v. State Bar,"' one of the earliest legal challenges to
IOLTA, the Court of Appeals of California laid down reasoning for
upholding IOLTA that was echoed in later cases."1 The petitioner
challenged California's IOLTA scheme on Fifth Amendment takings
grounds."' Like the Supreme Court of Washington in 1984, the
California court concluded that because IOLTA applied only to client
107. See, e.g., Abood, 431 U.S. at 259 n.13.
108. See Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652,657 (1990).
109. See Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 475 U.S. 1, 19 (1986); see also
Massachusetts Bar Found., 993 F.2d at 977.
110. See Massachusetts Bar Found., 993 F.2d at 977.
111. 166 Cal. App. 1193 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985).
112. See id. at 1205.
113. See id at 1204.
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deposits that could not earn net income for the client, depositors had no
cognizable property interest in IOLTA proceeds." 4
In Cone v. State Bar,"' the Eleventh Circuit held that there was no
cognizable property interest implicated by IOLTA, using reasoning
similar to that in Carroll."6 Florida, where Cone originated, was the first
state to implement IOLTA and the first to face a federal suit."7 The class
action suit challenged IOLTA on Fifth Amendment takings grounds." 8
The lead plaintiff, who was the representative of a probated estate, sued
over $2.25 in interest that had reverted to IOLTA." 9 The Eleventh
Circuit held that because IOLTA deposits could not have earned net
interest for the depositors, the class members had no property interest in
those proceeds. 20
B. The Washington Legal Foundation Begins a Concerted Attack on
IOLTA Programs
Court challenges to IOLTA were significantly accelerated by the
decision of one organization, the Washington Legal Foundation (WLF),
to sue state IOLTA programs repeatedly in federal court. The WLF has
been the lead plaintiff in every federal court lawsuit to challenge IOLTA
in this decade.'2 ' The WLF has sought to convince the federal judiciary
that IOLTA is illegal and to shut down IOLTA programs.' As a result,
114. See id, at 1205. The court opined, in dicta:
When the regulation is one which promotes the common good, even by adjusting the benefits
and burdens of economic life, a compensable "taking" is less readily found than when there is a
physical government invasion. Where the public good is great, and a "taking" is minimal, it is
permissible.
See id. at 1206.
115. 819 F.2d 1002 (11th Cir. 1987).
116. Seeid, at 1007.
117. Seeid. at 1004.
118. Seeid.
119. See id.
120. See id. at 1007.
121. See Phillips v. Washington Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156 (1998) (Texas' IOLTA program);
Washington Legal Found. v. Massachusetts Bar Found., 993 F.2d 962, 979 (1st Cir. 1993)
(Massachusetts' IOLTA program); Washington Legal Found. v. Legal Found. of Wash., No. C-97-
0146C (W.D. Wash. Jan 30, 1998) (Washington's IOLTA program).
122. See, e.g., Massachusetts Bar Found., 993 F.2d at 970 ("The plaintiffs ask for declaratory and
injunctive relief to dismantle the operation of the mandatory IOLTA program.").
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federal lawsuits challenging IOLTA have increased in both number and
urgency.
The WLF is a politically conservative legal activist organization
headquartered in Washington, D.C. The WLF styles itself as "the
nation's preeminent center for public interest law advocating free-
enterprise principles, limited government, property rights, and reform of
the civil and criminal justice system."'" The WLF acknowledges that it
uses lawsuits as a tool to shape public policy along these conservative
lines." The National Board of Advisors for the WLF consists mostly of
conservative Republican politicians who help the organization define its
expressly political mission."z
The WLF, in cooperation with an attorney and an IOLTA depositor,
began its attack on IOLTA by challenging the Massachusetts IOLTA
program in Washington Legal Foundation v. Massachusetts Bar
Foundation.'26 The WLF raised both Fifth and First Amendment
challenges to the program. 2 In a creative twist on the takings claim, the
WLF alleged that the property right violated by IOLTA was not the
taking of the interest itself but a violation of the right to exclude others
from the beneficial use of that interest.'28 In support, the plaintiffs cited
cases dealing with the right to exclude others from real property.'29 One
plaintiff also alleged that the IOLTA program violated his First
123. Washington Legal Found., WLF's Mission and Goals (visited Sept. 20, 1999)
<http://www.wlf.org/mission.htm>.
124. See id. ("WLF is a unique institution with three essential cornerstone programs: shaping
public policy through aggressive litigation and advocacy; publishing timely legal studies; and
educating policy-makers and the public through extensive communications outreach.").
125. See Washington Legal Found., Advisory Board List (visited Sept. 20, 1999)
<http://www.wlf.orgladvisory.htm> (indicating that members include Bob Barr (R), U.S.
Representative, Georgia; Dan Burton (R), U.S. Representative, Indiana; Charles Canady (R), U.S.
Representative, Florida; Helen Chenoweth (R), U.S. Representative, Idaho; Tom DeLay (R), U.S.
Representative, Texas; Jesse Helms (R), U.S. Senator, North Carolina; and Henry J. Hyde (R), U.S.
Representative, Illinois); see also U.S. Senate, Senators of the 106th Congress (visited Sept. 20,
1999) <http:llwww.senate.gov/senators/index.cfin>; United States House of Representatives,
Offlcial Alphabetical Listing of the House of Representatives of the United States (visited Sept. 20,
1999) <http://clerkweb.house.gov/106/mbrcmteelmembers/mbrsalph/oalmfram.htm>. The WLF
receives funding from numerous conservative foundations, including the Carthage Foundation,
which is chaired by Richard Scaife. See Carthage Found., 1998 Annual Report (visited Sept. 20,
1999) <http://www.scaife.com/carthage.pdf >.
126. 993 F.2d 962 (Ist Cir. 1993).
127. See id at 969-70.
128. See id. at 974.
129. See id. (citing, e.g., Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982);
Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979)).
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Amendment associational rights by forcing depositors and attorneys to
support organizations whose actions "offend his political and ideological
beliefs."'"3 At the time, the First Amendment claim was a novel
argument against IOLTA, and the WLF has continued to employ this
claim in subsequent suits.' 3 '
The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit rejected the plaintiffs' Fifth
Amendment argument and held that any right to exclude others from the
beneficial use of IOLTA funds was an intangible right that is not
cognizable as property under Fifth Amendment analysis.'32 Balancing the
factors from regulatory takings analysis,'33 the court held that even if the
right to exclude were cognizable, IOLTA would not constitute a taking
of those interests.'34 The court stated that under traditional takings
analysis, "[t]he government may impose regulations to adjust rights and
economic interests among people for the public good."'
135
The court also rejected the plaintiffs' First Amendment claim'36 and
distinguished IOLTA from the union and bar association cases in two
ways. The court held that those cases contained "a connection between
dissenters and the organization so that dissenters reasonably under[stood]
that they [were] supporting the message propagated by the recipient
organization."' 37 The court saw no such relationship between IOLTA
depositors and the IOLTA program. 131 The court also held that because
depositors had no cognizable property interest in IOLTA proceeds, there
was no money taken and therefore no First Amendment violation.'
39
Because IOLTA required no connection, financial or otherwise, between
depositors and IOLTA activities, the court held that there was no
violation of the plaintiffs' First Amendment rights. 40
130. Massachusetts Bar Found., 993 F.2d at 970. Apparently, the WLF and the other plaintiffs
find the provision of legal services for the poor to be politically and ideologically offensive.
131. See infra Part II.D.
132. See Massachusetts Bar Found., 993 F.2d at 975-76.
133. See supra Part II.A.
134. See Massachusetts Bar Found., 993 F.2d at 974.
135. Id. at 974.
136. See id. at 976.
137. Id. at 979.
138. See id. at 980.
139. See id.
140. See id.
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C. The U.S. Supreme Court Holds That IOLTA Proceeds Are Property
Cognizable Under the Fifth Amendment
The WLF continued its attack on IOLTA in Texas. The Texas
Supreme Court established its IOLTA program in 1984241 Originally
voluntary, the Texas Supreme Court made participation mandatory in
1988.142 In 1994, the WLF coordinated with a client depositor and an
attorney from Texas to file suit in federal court claiming that Texas'
IOLTA program violated the Fifth and First Amendments.'43
In a departure from all state and federal precedent, the Fifth Circuit
ruled that under Texas law, IOLTA depositors had a valid property
interest in IOLTA proceeds for the purposes of takings and First
Amendment analysis.'" The court accepted the plaintiffs' argument that
Texas adhered to the "interest follows principal" maxim,' 45 even within
the IOLTA context." The court thus held that the interest proceeds
generated by IOLTA constituted cognizable property.147 In a limited
ruling, the court remanded to the district court the ultimate question of
whether IOLTA interfered with this property right enough to violate the
Fifth or First Amendments.14
The Texas Equal Access to Justice Foundation, the agency that
distributes Texas' IOLTA funds, appealed this decision to the U.S.
Supreme Court, and certiorari was granted on the following question:' 49
Is interest earned on client trust funds held by lawyers in IOLTA
accounts a property interest of the client or lawyer, cognizable
under the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution,
despite the fundamental precept of IOLTA that such funds, absent
141. See Elrich, supra note 32, at 895.
142. See id. at 896.
143. See Washington Legal Found. v. Texas Equal Access to Justice Found., 94 F.3d 996, 999
(5th Cir. 1996), aff'd sub nom. Phillips v. Washington Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156 (1998).
144. See id at 1004.
145. See supra Part LC.3.
146. See Texas Equal Access to Justice Found., 94 F.3d at 1003. In support of the Fifth Circuit's
analysis of Texas property law, see Sellers v. Harris County, 483 S.W.2d 242, 243 (Tex. 1972).
147. See Texas Equal Access to Justice Found, 94 F.3d at 1003.
148. See id at 1004.
149. See Phillips v. Washington Legal Found., 521 U.S. 1117 (1997) (granting petition for
certiorari).
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the IOLTA program, could [not] earn interest for the client of [sic]
lawyer? 5'
In a five-to-four decision, the Supreme Court affirmed the holding of
the Fifth Circuit.'' Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority,
observed that the Constitution protects but does not create property rights
and that "the existence of a property interest is determined by reference
to 'existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source
such as state law."" 52 The Court observed that the Texas Supreme Court
had expressly adopted the "interest follows principal" maxim adopted in
Sellers v. Harris County. 53 The Court also relied on a presumption of
deference for interpretations of state law by federal judges who are
citizens of the state in question, noting that the Fifth Circuit panel that
decided Phillips contained two native Texans.'54 Accordingly, the Court
upheld the Fifth Circuit's conclusion that a property right inhered in the
IOLTA context, even when a fund owner could not earn net interest
payments. 55 The Court also accepted the WLF's argument that the right
to exclude others from the use of principal deposits was a cognizable
property right that attached to IOLTA funds.'56
In his majority opinion, Chief Justice Rehnquist did not discuss any of
the prior federal or state cases that had upheld IOLTA. 57 Nor did the
majority reach the question of whether the IOLTA program worked an
unconstitutional taking of the property interest, leaving that question to
the Fifth Circuit. 158
In dissent, Justice Souter, writing for four members of the court,
protested the abstract exercise of finding a property right without
considering whether a taking had occurred:
150. Id.
151. See Phillips v. Washington Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156, 172 (1998).
152. Id. at 164 (quoting Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972)).
153. Id. at 165-66 (citing Sellers v. Harris County, 483 S.W.2d 242,243 (Tex. 1972)).
154. See id. at 172.
155. See id.
156. See id. at 170 ("While the interest income at issue here may have no economically realizable
value to its owner, possession, control, and disposition are nonetheless valuable rights that inhere in
the property.") (citing Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 715 (1987)). The Court reached this conclusion
without considering the distinction raised by the First Circuit in Massachusetts Bar Foundation,
between cases involving a right to exclude others from real property and cases such as this involving
a right to exclude others from "intangible" property. See supra Part III.B.
157. See Phillips, 524 U.S. at 156-72.
158. Seeid. at 172.
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It... makes good sense to consider what is property only in
connection with what is a compensable taking, an approach to Fifth
Amendment analysis that not only would avoid spending time on
what might turn out to be an entirely theoretical matter, but would
also reduce the risk of placing such undue emphasis on the
existence of a generalized property right as to distort the taking and
compensation analyses that necessarily follow before the Fifth
Amendment's significance can be known.'
Justice Souter worried that the Court's abstract determination of
property rights might encourage claims in other contexts where the
government holds and makes use of the funds of private parties. 0 Justice
Breyer, also writing for four, disagreed with the majority's conclusion
that IOLTA interest was private property, viewing the IOLTA program
as creating interest proceeds where none could exist otherwise."'
D. The WLF Attacks Washington State's IOLTA Program
On January 27, 1997, the WLF filed Washington Legal Foundation v.
Legal Foundation of Washington in the U.S. District Court for the
Western District of Washington, raising Fifth and First Amendment
challenges to Washington's IOLTA program. 62 The defendants include
the Legal Foundation of Washington (LFW), which distributes IOLTA
funds, and the members of the Supreme Court of Washington, who
oversee the implementation of IOLTA in their role as regulators of the
state's legal system. 63 This suit was filed after the Fifth Circuit decision
in Phillips but before the U.S. Supreme Court had affirmed that decision.
Interestingly, the WLF did not attack Washington's IOLTA program
in total but challenged only the provision relating to Limited Practice
Officers (LPOs).1'" It is not entirely clear why the WLF did this, but
there are indications that it was motivated by the actions of Washington
159. Id at 173 (Souter, J., dissenting).
160. See id at 178-79 (Souter, J., dissenting).
161. See id. at 182 (Breyer, J., dissenting) ('Here, federal law ensured that, in the absence of
IOLTA intervention, the client's principal would earn nothing.... [The holding in Webb's] says
little about this kind of principal, principal that otherwise is barren.) (emphasis in original).
162. See Complaint for Injunctive Relief, Washington Legal Found. v. Legal Found. of Wash.,
No. C-97-0146C (W.D. Wash. filed Jan. 27, 1997) [hereinafter Complaint].
163. See id
164. For a discussion of the role of LPOs in Washington and their participation in IOLTA, see
supra Part I.C.1.
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State Supreme Court Justice Richard Sanders.'65 Justice Sanders, who
joined the Court after adoption of APR 12.1," 6 privately corresponded
with members of the state's escrow industry regarding LPOs and the
IOLTA program. 67 In March 1996, he wrote to industry members,
indicating that the court was reconsidering the LPO component of
IOLTA and asking members of the escrow industry for input. 168 He wrote
again in May 1996, informing the industry that the court had chosen not
to repeal APR 12.1, over his dissent. 69 In its complaint, the WLF
discussed these letters as part of the case background. 7 ' Justice Sanders
has since been dismissed by stipulation as a defendant in the case,
17 1
probably because he agrees that the LPO portion of IOLTA should be
abolished.'72
All parties moved for summary judgment, and on January 30, 1998,
before the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in Phillips,73 District Court Judge
John Coughenour ruled that the claimants had no cognizable property
interest in IOLTA proceeds. 74 Although there was no specific discussion
of the plaintiffs' First Amendment claim, the judge indicated that "a
property interest is a prerequisite to establishing either a First or Fifth
Amendment claim."' 75 Rejecting the reasoning of the Fifth Circuit in
Phillips, Judge Coughenour aligned himself with the analysis from Cone
v. State Bar, writing, "The Fifth Circuit's reasoning [in Phillips]
overlooks the fact that in no event can the client-depositors make any net
return on the interest accrued in these accounts. Indeed, if the funds were
able to make any net return, they would not be subject to the IOLTA
165. See Complaint, supra note 162, at 12.
166. Washington Admission to Practice Rule 12.1 is the provision that includes the operations of
Limited Practice Officers in the IOLTA regime. See supra Part I.C. 1.
167. See Complaint, supra note 162, at 12.
168. See id.
169. See id.
170. See id.
171. See Washington Legal Found. v. Legal Found. of Wash., No. C-97-0146C (W.D. Wash. May
15, 1997) (stipulation and order of dismissal as to Richard B. Sanders, Justice of the Supreme Court
of Washington).
172. See Complaint, supra note 162, at 12.
173. The Phillips ruling was issued on June 15, 1998. See Phillips v. Washington Legal Found.,
524 U.S. 156 (1998).
174. See Washington Legal Found. v. Legal Found. of Wash., No. C-97-0146C, at 8 (W.D. Wash.
Jan. 30, 1998) (order granting defendants' motion for summary judgment).
175. md. at5.
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program."'76 Having concluded that no property right existed, Judge
Coughenour granted summary judgment for the defendants.'
The WLF appealed this decision to the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit, and that decision is currently pending. The U.S. Supreme Court
has since ruled in Phillips. In this newly unsettled landscape, the Ninth
Circuit ruling will be the next significant signpost for IOLTA case law.
III. WASHINGTON'S IOLTA PROGRAM DOES NOT VIOLATE
THE FIFTH OR FIRST AMENDMENT
The Ninth Circuit should look to Washington property law and hold
that in Washington, IOLTA proceeds do not constitute private property
for the purposes of Fifth or First Amendment analysis. Alternatively, the
court should recognize that, under regulatory takings analysis, IOLTA
does not effect a taking. The court should also hold that Washington's
IOLTA program does not impermissibly burden the First Amendment
right not to associate.
A. There Is No Property Interest Implicated by IOLTA in Washington
The Ninth Circuit should affirm Judge Coughenour's decision and
hold that under Washington law, IOLTA proceeds do not constitute
private property for the purpose of takings analysis. The holding in
Phillips applied Texas property law but cannot be extrapolated to define
the law of property in any other state. Therefore, the Ninth Circuit is not
bound by the definition of property delineated in Phillips. The court must
look to Washington law and its interpretation by Washington courts to
determine the definition of property as it applies in this case.
In Phillips, the Supreme Court clarified that the existence of a
property interest is determined by extrinsic sources such as state law.'78
Evaluating Texas property law, the Court pointed out that a Texas state
court case, Sellers v. Harris County, had independently established that
the Texas Supreme Court followed the "interest follows principal"
176. See id at 7.
177. See id. at 9.
178. See Phillips, 524 U.S. at 164 (1998) (citing Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577
(1972)). Although the Court made clear that a "[s]tate may not sidestep the Takings Clause by
disavowing traditional property interests long recognized under state law," the definition of these
"traditional property interests" is also ascertained by reference to state law. Id. at 165-66 (citing
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1029 (1992)) (other citations omitted).
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maxim established in the Webb 's case.17 9 Under this maxim, the proceeds
from Texas' IOLTA program constituted property for Fifth Amendment
purposes. 80 The Phillips decision was made in reference to state property
law, which is the appropriate focus in determining the definition of
property for takings clause purposes.'
8
'
The Ninth Circuit should look to the Supreme Court of Washington to
ascertain the definition of property in Washington. State supreme courts
are the highest interpretive authorities on issues of state law.'82 In its
1984 IOLTA rule-making opinion, the Supreme Court of Washington
directly considered whether Washington adheres to the "interest follows
principal" maxim from Webb's and concluded that in the IOLTA
context, Washington does not.8 3 The rule-making opinion dramatically
distinguishes Washington Legal Foundation from Phillips, because the
Texas Supreme Court did not issue such a statement on Texas property
law when it adopted IOLTA in 1984.84
Also, the U.S. Supreme Court has identified a presumption of
deference for interpretations of state law by federal judges who are
citizens of the state in question.'85 This presumption, which applies to
district and circuit court judges, was cited with approval in Phillips as a
reason for upholding the findings of the Fifth Circuit panel. 186 Judge
Coughenour's interpretation of Washington law is due this same
presumption of deference.8 7 He is a resident of the state of Washington
and a member of the Washington Bar.18  His Order, which is consistent
with the rule-making opinion of the Supreme Court of Washington,
should guide the Ninth Circuit in interpreting Washington property law.
179. See id. at 165-66 (citing Sellers v. Harris County, 483 S.W.2d 242, 243 (Tex. 1972)).
180. See id. at 172.
181. See id.
182. See Wainright v. Goode, 464 U.S. 78, 84 (1983) ("[T]he views of the State's highest court
with respect to state law are binding on the federal courts.").
183. See IOLTA Adoption Order, supra note 38, at 1108-09.
184. See Brennan J. Torregrossa, Note, Washington Legal Foundation v. Texas Equal Access to
Justice Foundation: Is There an IOTA of Property Interest in IOL TA?, 42 Vill. L. Rev. 189, 201 n.55
(1997).
185. See Bernhard v. Polygraphic Co. of Am., 350 U.S. 198, 204 (1956); see also supra note 154
and accompanying text.
186. See Phillips, 524 U.S. at 167.
187. See Bernhard, 350 U.S. at 204.
188. See 1 Aspen Law & Bus., Almanac of the Federal Judiciary 204-05 (1999).
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The Ninth Circuit's recent holding in Schneider v. California
Department of Corrections18 9 does not alter this conclusion. In
Schneider, state prisoners filed a takings clause challenge to a California
statute that created interest-bearing trust accounts for inmates and
diverted the interest proceeds to the Inmate Welfare Fund. 9 The Ninth
Circuit panel concluded that the "interest follows principal" rule was
firmly established within the core meaning of property such that a state
could not appropriate interest by statute without triggering takings clause
analysis. 9' Citing Phillips, the panel ruled that state law could not re-
characterize property in opposition to this core meaning.92 In this regard,
the Ninth Circuit went further than the U.S. Supreme Court, which
specifically looked to sources of state law in the ruling in Phillips.93
Schneider is distinguishable from the Washington IOLTA case
because of its reliance on California property law. In Schneider, the
Ninth Circuit thought it significant that California courts had expressly
adopted the "interest follows principal" maxim as a tenet of state
property law.' 94 As discussed above, the Supreme Court of Washington
has specifically rejected blanket adoption of the "interest follows
principal" maxim.' 9
Further, if the Ninth Circuit meant to conclude that all interest earned
on all funds in all cases creates a cognizable property right, the court
should reconsider this conclusion in the IOLTA context. There are other
situations where state action interferes with interest proceeds. For
example, in Washington, state statutes require the use of designated trust
funds for real estate brokers196 and county court litigants. 97 The Ninth
Circuit should narrowly construe its holding in Schneider, lest it establish
an immutable constitutional definition of property that will result in
189. 151 F.3d 1194 (9th Cir. 1998).
190. See id. at 1195.
191. Seeid. at 1201.
192. See id. at 1200.
193. See Phillips v. Washington Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156, 165-67 (1998) (citing Sellers v.
Harris County, 483 S.W.2d 242,243 (Tex. 1972)).
194. See Schneider, 151 F.3d at 1201 ("The 'interest follows principal' rule's common law
pedigree, and near-universal endorsement by American courts-including California's-leave us
with little doubt that the interest income of the sort at issue here is sufficiently fundamental that
States may not appropriate it without implicating the Takings Clause.") (citations omitted).
195. See supra note 183 and accompanying text.
196. See Wash. Rev. Code § 18.85.310 (1998).
197. See Wash. Rev. Code § 36.48.090 (1998).
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incessant federal court challenges to every type of state interference with
interest proceeds.
If the Ninth Circuit concludes that IOLTA proceeds do not create a
cognizable property interest, it must affirm Judge Coughenour's opinion
dismissing the IOLTA suit. If no cognizable property right exists in
IOLTA proceeds, then there is no basis on which to sustain a Fifth
Amendment challenge to IOLTA1
98
B. Per Se Takings Analysis Is Not the Appropriate Legal Standard for
Evaluating the Washington IOLTA Case
Even if the Ninth Circuit concludes that IOLTA proceeds are property
for the purposes of takings analysis, the court should conclude that the
Limited Practice Officer (LPO) portion of Washington's IOLTA
program does not work an unconstitutional taking of that property. To
reach this question, the court must first determine whether the IOLTA
program should be evaluated as a per se taking or if regulatory takings
analysis from Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York'"
applies.2"e
Per se takings analysis does not apply to Washington's IOLTA
program because per se takings usually involve the physical invasion of
property or the destruction of all economically beneficial use of land."'
In cases involving government interference with money, rather than real
property, courts have been reluctant to apply the per se takings
doctrine."2 For example, in United States v. Sperry Corp., °3 the U.S.
Supreme Court indicated that the appropriation of money cannot easily
be analogized to per se takings cases involving the invasion of real
property.'O The Ninth Circuit relied on this case in Commercial Builders
v. City of Sacramento0 5 to reject the argument that the appropriation of
198. See Washington Legal Found. v. Legal Found. of Wash., No. C-97-0146C, at 5 (W.D. Wash.
Jan. 30, 1998) (order granting defendant's motion for summary judgment).
199. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
200. For a discussion of Penn Central, see supra Part II.A.
201. See, e.g., Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015-16 (1992); Loretto
v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982) (determining when physical
occupation of property has occurred).
202. See, e.g., United States v. Sperry Corp., 493 U.S. 52, 62 n.9 (1989).
203. 493 U.S. 52 (1989).
204. See id.
205. 941 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1991).
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money, as a fee, could be analyzed using the per se takings doctrine
because unlike real property, money is fungible." 6 Other circuit courts
have recognized this same distinction.207 The U.S. Supreme Court has
held that even an individual appropriation of millions of dollars could not
be evaluated as a per se taking because there was no permanent physical
invasion of property as contemplated by per se takings analysis.0"
The LPO portion of Washington's IOLTA program does not invade
property enough to invoke per se takings doctrine. IOLTA aggregates
interest from small or short-term client deposits.2°9 The interest earned on
any one deposit is minimal °.2 1  The appropriation applies only to the
interest earned and does not affect principal funds in any way.
Furthermore, the IOLTA depositor has no reasonable expectation of
receiving those interest payments in the absence of IOLTA.2 ' As with
the appropriation of millions of dollars,2 12 the appropriation of small
IOLTA payments must also lie outside per se takings analysis.
Key precedents in IOLTA caselaw have indicated that regulatory
takings analysis is the appropriate standard for evaluating IOLTA. In
Webb's, which established the maxim that "interest follows principal,"
the U.S. Supreme Court cited to Penn Central in concluding that the
Florida statute was unconstitutional."' Also, the four dissenters in
Phillips, the only justices to engage the takings question, agreed that
regulatory takings analysis under Penn Central was the appropriate
inquiry for IOLTA.
2 14
206. See id at 875.
207. See, e.g., Branch v. United States, 69 F.3d 1571, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1995); Nixon v. United
States, 978 F.2d 1269, 1284-85 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
208. See Eastern Enter. v. Apfel, 524 U.S 498, 517, 522-23 (1998) (holding that millions of
dollars in statutorily required payments could not be analyzed as per se taking).
209. See Wash. Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.14(b)(3) (1999).
210. Recall that the Florida lawsuit involved interest proceeds of $2.25. See Cone v. State Bar,
819 F.2d 1002, 1004 (11th Cir. 1987).
211. See IOLTA Adoption Order, supra note 38, at 1101.
212. See Eastern Enter., 524 U.S. at 517, 522-23.
213. See Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 163 (1980) ("This Court
has been permissive in upholding governmental action that may deny the property owner of some
beneficial use of his property or that may restrict the owner's full exploitation of the property, if such
public action is justified as promoting the general welfare.") (citing Penn Central Transp. v. City of
New York, 438 U.S. 104, 125-29 (1978)) (other citations omitted).
214. See Phillips v. Washington Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156, 176 (1998) (Souter, J., dissenting)
("[A]pplication of Penn Central would not bode well for claimants like respondents.").
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In Massachusetts Bar Foundation, the First Circuit explicitly weighed
the Penn Central regulatory takings factors in analyzing IOLTA,
balancing these factors to reject the argument that IOLTA effected a
taking.2" 5 The First Circuit considered the takings question under the
assumption that IOLTA did interfere with some cognizable property
right.21 6 To date, it is the only circuit court to have directly considered the
takings issue, and its analysis was not overturned by the limited holding
of the Supreme Court in Phillips.217
C. Under Regulatory Takings Analysis, Washington 's IOLTA Regime
Does Not Constitute a Taking of Private Property
Even if there is a property interest, regulatory takings analysis is the
appropriate standard for evaluating the WLF's takings claim against
Washington's IOLTA program. Regulatory takings analysis is applied
when government regulation affects private property but does not
deprive the property owner of all beneficial use of that property.2"8 Three
factors are generally applied in regulatory takings analysis: (1) the economic
impact on the takings claimant, (2) the investment-backed expectations of
the property owner, and (3) the nature of the government action.19
Weighing these factors to obtain a just outcome, Washington's
IOLTA program does not effect an unconstitutional taking of private
property.220 Concerning the first factor, there is no identifiable economic
impact on LPOs or their clients from IOLTA. Washington's IOLTA rule
requires that LPO client funds that are capable of earning a positive
return of interest be excluded from IOLTA.22' The direct economic
impact on LPOs and their clients is therefore nil. Although the U.S.
Supreme Court recognized the right to possession and control of IOLTA
interest proceeds as a property right,222 this is an intangible right without
215. See Washington Legal Found. v. Massachusetts Bar Found., 993 F.2d 962, 976 (lst Cir.
1993).
216. See id. at 974.
217. See Phillips, 524 U.S. at 172 (holding that IOLTA proceeds are property but expressing no
view as to whether IOLTA represents taking).
218. See, e.g., Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
219. See id. at 124.
220. See supra Part II.A.
221. See Wash. Admission to Practice Rule 12.1(c)(3)(i)-(iii).
222. See Phillips, 524 U.S. at 170.
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a direct economic component.' The removal of this "thin strand [from]
the commonly recognized bundle of property rights" is of minimal
impact to depositors. 4
Likewise, IOLTA depositors have no investment-backed expectations
from IOLTA deposits. Depositors would not expect to earn interest on
IOLTA-sized deposits, even if IOLTA were abolished outright.' The
funds are not deposited for the purposes of earning interest on an
investment; they are deposited to facilitate legal transactions.
The third factor of regulatory takings analysis concerns the nature of
the government action. 6 This factor is included in takings analysis to
allow governments significant leeway to burden property when
exercising the government function.2 Regulatory takings cases have
recognized that when a regulation is designed to promote the common
good, the government and social interests are a strong counterbalance to
Fifth Amendment protections for property owners. 8 Government could
not function otherwise."
Especially because Washington's IOLTA program, as a government
action, has such beneficial effect on society, it does not effect a taking.
At its core, Washington's IOLTA program is designed as an
"adjust[ment of the] benefits and burdens of economic life to promote
the common good. ' ° The IOLTA program takes advantage of banking
laws to aggregate small interest payments that previously devolved to
banks, using these funds to finance essential legal services programs.
Because the social need for such programs is clear, Washington's
IOLTA program supports an important public good. Under regulatory
takings analysis, the Ninth Circuit should reject the WLF's Fifth
Amendment challenge to Washington's IOLTA program.
223. See Washington Legal Found. v. Massachusetts Bar Found., 993 F.2d 962, 974 n.10 (lst Cir. 1993).
224. Id. at 976.
225. If that were to happen, the interest proceeds would again revert to the banks holding the
deposits, providing them with unearned windfall profits. See supra Part I.B.
226. See Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
227. See, e.g., Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922) (indicating that
government would be unable to function if every burden on private property required compensation).
228. See, e.g., Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124.
229. See Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 413.
230. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124.
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D. Washington's IOLTA Program Does Not Violate the First
Amendment Right to Freedom ofAssociation
The government speech doctrine protects Washington's IOLTA
program from First Amendment challenge. The government speech
doctrine removes the First Amendment limits on compelled fmancial
support discussed in the bar association and labor union cases"' when
government agencies act in a governmental capacity.3 2
The Supreme Court of Washington should be considered a
government agency for the purposes of First Amendment analysis. In
Keller, the U.S. Supreme Court suggested that a state supreme court
engages in functions sufficiently governmental to meet the requirements
of the government speech doctrine. 3 A state supreme court acts in the
arena of public policy because it sets policy for the legal profession.3
The Supreme Court of Washington created IOLTA through the Rules
of Professional Conduct and the Admission to Practice Rules for
LPOs.us By controlling lawyer discipline and rule revision, the court
continues to exert controlling authority over IOLTA. 26 The WLF
acknowledged the controlling role of the Supreme Court of Washington
by naming the justices of that court as defendants in the Washington
suit. 7 Through IOLTA, the Supreme Court of Washington acted to help
provide legal services for low-income people. It is government acting as
government, and the ideological opposition of individual IOLTA
depositors cannot create a legitimate First Amendment dispute over the
program.
Even if the Ninth Circuit does not uphold Washington's IOLTA
program under the government speech doctrine, the IOLTA program
does not otherwise implicate the First Amendment right not to associate
231. See supra Part II.B.
232. See Keller v. State Bar, 496 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1990).
233. See id. at 11-12 ("The State Bar does not admit anyone to the practice of law, it does not
finally disbar or suspend anyone, and it does not ultimately establish ethical codes of conduct. All of
those functions are reserved by California law to the State Supreme Court.").
234. See id.
235. See Wash. Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.14 (1999); see also Wash. Admission to
Practice Rules 12(h), 12.1 (1999).
236. See Wash. Rev. Code § 2.48.060 (1998) (granting Supreme Court of Washington final rule-
making authority); see also Wash. General Rule 9 (1999) (outlining rule-making procedure).
237. See Complaint, supra note 162.
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discussed in the bar association and labor union cases.ns This right is
implicated when a dissenting member is forced, through financial
support and otherwise, to associate with an organization that engages in
unrelated ideological activities. 9 The relationship between the dissenter
and the organization must consist of more than just limited financial
support.240 It must create a situation in which the dissenter cannot
disavow the message of the organization.24
No such relationship exists between LPOs, their clients, and the
activities of Washington's IOLTA program. Individual IOLTA
depositors are not required to affirm or participate in IOLTA activities in
any way.242 The IOLTA program does not even have access to the names
of individual depositors.243 Therefore, there is no risk that IOLTA
depositors could be personally associated with the activities of IOLTA.
Also, the financial contributions are in effect zero, because the interest
payments that are donated to IOLTA would not accrue to LPOs or their
clients even if IOLTA were abolished. Therefore, there is an insufficient
compelled relationship to invoke the First Amendment right of refusal to
associate.24
Should the Ninth Circuit rule that the activities of Washington's
IOLTA program have ideological content, compelled financial support
for these activities is justified by the state's need to improve the quality
of legal services for the poor.243 In Keller, the Supreme Court indicated
that compelled support of bar association activities is permitted when
these activities are necessary to regulate the legal profession or improve
the legal services available to citizens.246 IOLTA seeks to improve the
quality of the legal profession by providing access to justice for the low-
income citizens of Washington. This mission fits squarely within the
scope of permissible activity outlined by the Supreme Court in Keller. 47
238. See, e.g., Keller, 496 U.S. 1; see also supra Part II.B.
239. See supra Part I.B; see also Washington Legal Found. v. Massachusetts Bar Found., 993
F.2d 962, 979-80 (1st Cir. 1993).
240. See Massachusetts Bar Found., 993 F.2d at 979-80.
241. See id
242. See id. at 980.
243. Telephone Interview with Barbara Clark, Executive Director, Legal Foundation of
Washington (Aug. 18, 1999).
244. See Massachusetts Bar Found., 993 F.2d at 980.
245. See supra Part ll.B; see also Keller v. State Bar, 496 U.S. 1, 14 (1990).
246. See Keller, 496 U.S. at 14 (citing Lathrop v. Donahue, 367 U.S. 820, 843 (1961)).
247. See id. at 13-14.
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Further, there is no basis for concluding that, through Washington's
IOLTA program, the Legal Foundation of Washington or the Supreme
Court of Washington is engaged in ideologically driven expression. The
U.S. Supreme Court has indicated that it is difficult to discern between
activities that are expressive and those that are not.248 At the most
extreme, expressive activities can include direct political advocacy, such
as endorsement of gun control or nuclear weapons freeze initiatives. 49
IOLTA does not fund such activities. The Foundation funds direct
service programs that provide legal advocacy to Washington citizens
who would be otherwise unable to afford representation."' Although the
WLF and other plaintiffs may oppose such efforts, these services fulfill a
needed government function. They are not expression.
If the Ninth Circuit views the activities of Washington's IOLTA
program as expression, that expression is not sufficiently ideological to
support the WLF's First Amendment claim. To trigger First Amendment
scrutiny in cases involving compelled financial support, an organi-
zation's activities must have ideological content and must be unrelated to
advancing the goals of the organization. 5 IOLTA meets neither
criterion. Its activities are service based, not ideological, and these
activities are tied directly to the legitimate goal of improving the quality
of justice.22 The WLF's view that such activities are impermissibly
ideological would subvert the important distinction that the U.S. Supreme
Court identified between political and nonpolitical expression.2" Not all
activities are political, and the WLF cannot render IOLTA's activities
political simply by asserting a personal objection to them.
Finally, even if the Ninth Circuit views Washington's IOLTA
program as an infringement on First Amendment rights, the infringement
is justified by a compelling state interest in improving the quality of legal
services for the poor. The state may regulate First Amendment rights
when the regulation is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state
248. See id. at 15-16.
249. See id.
250. See supra Part I.C.2.
251. See Keller, 496 U.S. at 15.
252. See, e.g., Lathrop v. Donahue, 367 U.S. 820, 843 (1961).
253. See Keller, 496 U.S. at 15-16 (discussing distinction between activities related to regulation
of legal profession and activities of "political or ideological coloration which are not reasonably
related to the advancement of such goals").
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interest.2- Washington's IOLTA program was created to serve the
compelling need for improved legal services for poor people. Because
individual depositors could not receive IOLTA proceeds in the absence
of IOLTA, any burden on them is small and narrowly tailored. If IOLTA
does implicate the First Amendment, it does so in a targeted manner and
for a good reason. Any First Amendment infringement is therefore
permissible.
E. Impacts and Implications of the Phillips Decision
The Phillips decision, although it did not resolve the ultimate issues
raised by the IOLTA suits, has already damaged the legal services
system in Washington and around the country. Understandably, it has
degraded the morale of those who work providing civil legal services to
the poor.5 These people work under tight budgetary and salary
constraints to provide a basic modicum of services to growing numbers
of underrepresented people. These advocates now face the prospect of
years of protracted legal battles to preserve the existence of a system that
is already inadequately funded. By failing to consider the larger
implications of its decision in Phillips, the Court chose to bog down legal
services over a constitutional abstraction. The advocates who work
tirelessly in this field rightly perceive the U.S. Supreme Court's decision
as a stinging rebuke. 6
The Phillips ruling is especially disheartening because IOLTA
supporters understand that the WLF's attempt to undo IOLTA is
politically motivated. 7 The WLF sues because it ideologically objects to
the activities of some IOLTA-funded programs, including programs that
provide civil legal services to refugees seeking political asylum in
254. See supra Part lI.B; see also Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 657
(1990).
255. See Deford, supra note 33, at 287.
256. Deford states:
For poverty law advocates the 1997-1998 term of the Supreme Court will probably be
remembered above all for the Court's troubling decision in Phillips v. Washington Legal
Foundation. Confronted by dramatic cuts in congressional funding for legal services, programs
have relied on IOLTA funding as a financial bulwark against the further erosion of client access
to equal justice.
Id.
257. The WLF expressly acknowledges that it uses litigation to try to shape public policy along
conservative lines. See Washington Legal Found., supra note 123.
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America. 8 In their political opposition to these programs, the WLF
seeks to dismantle completely the operations of IOLTA. The
professionals who work under difficult circumstances to provide legal
services to the poor are justified in seeing the WLF as the proverbial
"dog in the manger."
259
The Phillips ruling will have other impacts. It will likely produce other
constitutional challenges to IOLTA in numerous jurisdictions. 2 0 Also,
programs that are now voluntary, or that have opt-out provisions, are likely
to see funding decline as attorneys become more reluctant to place funds
into IOLTA accounts for fear of legal challenges. 261' The current movement
of states to shift from voluntary to mandatory programs may cease until
the IOLTA challenge is resolved. 62 The result may be a significant
decrease in funding for IOLTA, which will disrupt legal services programs
that already struggle under cuts from other public funding sources. 63
V. CONCLUSION
The WLF has led a concerted, eight-year assault on IOLTA in the
federal courts. This campaign could eliminate one of the cornerstones of
the legal services system in America. The U.S. Supreme Court has given
new impetus to this attack through its unfortunate decision in Phillips.
However, neither the law nor justice supports IOLTA opponents.
Ultimately, the IOLTA cases, including the Washington suit, should
resolve in favor of IOLTA programs.
The Ninth Circuit has an opportunity to affirm the constitutionality, and
the importance, of Washington's IOLTA program. The court should rule
that the IOLTA program does not implicate property rights and affirm the
decision of Judge Coughenour. Alternatively, the court should reject, on
the merits, the Fifth and First Amendment challenges to this essential
program. Any other result would spell disaster for the legal rights of low-
income Washington citizens.
258. See, e.g., Washington Legal Found. v. Texas Equal Access to Justice Found., 94 F.3d 996,
998 (5th Cir. 1996).
259. The dog in the manger jealously guards the hay. He cannot eat the hay himself, but will not
allow the other animals to eat it either. The application of the story is: "Some begrudge others what
they cannot enjoy themselves." Aesop, Aesop's Fables 1 (Grosset & Dunlap eds., 1947).
260. See Torregrossa, supra note 184, at 219.
261. See id. at 220.
262. See id.
263. See id.
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